REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

TRANSITIONAL SOVEREIGNTY COUNCIL

ADVISORY BOARD

EVIDENTIARY REPORT

LAUNCHED FROM ETHIOPIA

Forensic, geospatial and documentary evidence of Ethiopia's role in the drone war against the Republic of Sudan



KHARTOUM · OCTOBER 2026

About This Report

The Republic of Sudan presents evidence that armed drone operations against its territory are being launched from Ethiopia. This report identifies the facilities and border areas attacked, examines recovered aircraft and their onboard data, and records the attacks and their consequences. It brings together the findings presented by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, the Military Intelligence Authority and the General Intelligence Service on 28 October 2026 and sets out Sudan's official position.

Several findings form the core of the report.

One concerns a flight-control computer recovered from a long-range attack drone brought down at Ad-Damazin on 20 September 2026. Its memory contains a twelve-item programmed mission beginning at **10.7220° N, 34.7662° E**, near Gizen. Sudan's analysis of two boundary datasets places that programmed take-off point **1.7 kilometres inside Ethiopia**. The disclosed coordinates describe a route of **134.04 kilometres**, with the take-off point, initial climb and approximately the first ten kilometres of the planned route on the Ethiopian side. The report presents the mission commands, coordinates, altitude profile and geographic reconstruction, allowing this central exhibit to be examined point by point.

A second body of evidence concerns **Bayraktar Akıncı aircraft attributed to operations from Bahir Dar Air Base**. The report presents **recovered wreckage, reconstructed tracks and manufacturer plates bearing individual component serial numbers**. These identifiers provide a concrete means of checking the aircraft's supply history against manufacturer and export records. **Sudan calls for verification of the end-users and a determination of whether the relevant export undertakings have been breached**.

The technical exhibits also distinguish three classes of attack drone recovered on the Blue Nile front: **fibre-optic FPV drones, long-range fixed-wing one-way attack aircraft, and short-range electric flying wings**. Their control systems, payloads and assessed ranges are examined alongside the geography of the attacks. This analysis identifies the operational constraints relevant to locating launch positions and explains the basis on which the Government of Sudan attributes attacks to Asosa, Bahir Dar and the Kurmuk–Gizen border sector.

The incident annex records **seventy attacks between 15 February and 27 October 2026**, attributed to Ethiopian launch areas. The specified quantities

include **187 one-way attack drones and 82 munitions fired by strategic drones**. October accounts for twenty-eight incidents and ninety-seven of the recorded one-way drones. The consolidated official figures record **484 civilians killed or wounded, 176 Sudanese soldiers killed and 200 wounded**.

Human consequences are documented through individual incidents. At **Abu Shendi in Wad el-Mahi on 9 October**, the report records **thirty civilians killed**—twenty-six women and four children—and one **hundred wounded**. In **Khartoum on 19 October, three young children were killed in their home**. Other entries document damage to hospitals, schools, residential buildings and fuel facilities, as well as **six power stations put out of service on 26–27 October**.

Independent reporting supplies additional evidence concerning the infrastructure and support networks surrounding this offensive campaign. The report examines **Reuters's investigation** into the **Menge training camp** and developments at **Asosa Airport**, **Yale Humanitarian Research Lab's findings** concerning activity consistent with military support to **the RSF at an Ethiopian military base**, and **satellite monitoring of cargo movements**. These sources provide **context and corroboration for aspects of the case; the recovered hardware, mission data and incident records** remain central to examining particular operations.

Sudan's official position is clear. It holds Ethiopia internationally responsible for the cross-border operations and support documented in this report. It demands the immediate cessation of launches against Sudan, the closure of Ethiopian facilities to RSF and third-party attack operations, the dismantling of the Menge camp, and the withdrawal of support sustaining the militia. It seeks accountability and reparation for the resulting injury and destruction.

Sudan calls on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council to consider the matter urgently and take the necessary steps to ensure that all Member States comply with international law and the charters binding upon them, particularly the provisions concerning non-interference and the prevention of aggression as a cornerstone of international law. The Government of Sudan will pursue formal complaints against the States implicated and reserves its rights under international law, including any applicable right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The Government of Sudan offers the recovered wreckage, flight-control hardware, original files and chain-of-custody records for independent technical examination under United Nations or African Union auspices. Its demand is that the evidence be examined and the attacks brought to an end.

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Executive Introduction

The Republic of Sudan is being attacked from the territory of a neighbouring State. Since February 2026, armed drones have taken off from Ethiopian soil — from Asosa Airport in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region, from the Ethiopian side of the Kurmuk–Gizen border sector, and from Bahir Dar Air Base in the Amhara Region — to strike Sudanese cities and civilians. **This is not an allegation. It is a fact,** established by the physical, digital and geospatial evidence set out in this report.

The attackers delivered the decisive proof themselves. On 20 September 2026 the Sudanese Armed Forces brought down a long-range attack drone at Ad-Damazin. Its flight-control computer was recovered and its memory extracted. It holds the complete pre-programmed mission and records, in the aircraft's own data, a take-off at **10.7220° N, 34.7662° E which is 1.7 kilometres inside Ethiopia**, near the Ethiopian locality of Gizen and 65 kilometres from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The take-off, the initial climb and the first ten kilometres of the programmed route all lie over Ethiopian territory. The Government of Sudan has verified the data: the route length recomputed from the raw coordinates matches the extracted figure to the hundredth of a kilometre, and both the national boundary of Ethiopia and the United Nations boundary of Sudan place the take-off point on the Ethiopian side.

State-grade aircraft fly from an Ethiopian air base. Bayraktar Akıncı strategic drones — an aircraft that Türkiye sells only to sovereign governments, and which the Ethiopian Air Force publicly inducted in January 2024 — have flown from Bahir Dar Air Base to attack Sudan. One was shot down near El Obeid on 17 March 2026, a second near Ad-Damazin on 23 May and a third over Dindiro on 23 August; two Bayraktar TB2 followed in October. The wreckage carries manufacturer plates whose part and serial numbers identify, in the records of the manufacturer and of the exporting State, the aircraft and their end-user. The El Obeid aircraft had been routed through the airspace of South Sudan to evade Sudanese air defences — the signature of a professional State air-operations staff.

The launch infrastructure has also been exposed by independent investigators and OSINT sources. Reuters revealed in February 2026 that Ethiopia had built a camp at Menge where 4,300 RSF fighters were in training — set up, according to an internal Ethiopian security note, by the Chief of Defence Intelligence of the Ethiopian National Defence Force — and that a drone ground-control station and a satellite antenna had been installed at Asosa Airport. In April 2026 the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale reported clear visual evidence that RSF attacks on Blue Nile State were launched from inside Ethiopia. Satellite monitoring has since tracked cargo aircraft linked to the United Arab Emirates landing at Asosa.

The price is paid in Sudanese lives. Sudanese Government agencies have logged **seventy attacks launched from Ethiopian territory** between 15 February and 27 October 2026, involving 187 recorded suicide drones and 82 munitions fired by strategic drones. They have killed or wounded 484 civilians and killed 176 Sudanese soldiers. At Wad el-Mahi on 9 October, a drone attack on displaced families killed thirty people — twenty-six women and four children — and wounded

one hundred. In Khartoum on 19 October, three children aged two to six were killed in their home. On 26 and 27 October six power stations were put out of service, plunging millions into darkness. The campaign is escalating: October alone accounts for twenty-eight of the seventy attacks.

Ethiopia has answered this evidence with denials and counter-accusations but never with an explanation. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia bears full international responsibility for the armed attacks launched from its territory against the Republic of Sudan. Sudan will lodge a formal complaint against the States involved, stands ready to place the recovered wreckage before an independent international team of experts, and reserves in full its inherent legal right to respond should the international mechanisms fail to enforce international law.

This report sets out the evidence. **It is conclusive.**

70 *drone attacks launched from Ethiopian territory, 15 Feb – 27 Oct 2026*	**1.7 km** *inside Ethiopia: take-off point recorded by a recovered flight computer*	**5** *strategic drones shot down — three Bayraktar Akıncı and two Bayraktar TB2*
187 *suicide drones recorded, and 82 munitions fired by strategic drones*	**484** *civilians killed or wounded (consolidated figures)*	**176** *Sudanese soldiers killed in attacks launched from Ethiopia*

The five findings

1	**The launch sites are in Ethiopia.** Attacks are launched from Asosa Airport in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region, from the Ethiopian side of the Kurmuk border sector, from the Gizen area opposite Geissan, and from Bahir Dar Air Base in the Amhara Region.
2	**A recovered flight computer proves it.** The autopilot of a long-range attack drone brought down at Ad-Damazin on 20 September 2026 records its take-off at 10.7220° N, 34.7662° E — 1.7 km inside Ethiopia. Its programmed 134.04 km route enters Sudanese airspace only about ten kilometres after take-off.
3	**State-grade aircraft fly from an Ethiopian air base.** Bayraktar Akıncı strategic drones — a system sold only to sovereign governments, and publicly inducted into the Ethiopian Air Force in January 2024 — flew from Bahir Dar Air Base. Serial-numbered Baykar and Aselsan components were recovered from aircraft downed near El Obeid and Ad-Damazin.
4	**The campaign targets civilians.** Hospitals, schools, homes, displaced-persons sites, fuel stations and power stations have been struck. At Wad el-Mahi on 9 October, thirty people — twenty-six women and four children — were killed and one hundred wounded. In Khartoum on 19 October, three children aged two to six were killed. Six power stations were knocked out on 26–27 October.
5	**Independent investigations corroborate every element.** Reuters exposed an Ethiopian-hosted RSF training camp and a drone ground-control station at Asosa Airport; the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale found clear visual evidence that RSF attacks on Blue Nile were launched from inside Ethiopia; satellite monitoring has tracked UAE-linked cargo aircraft at Asosa.

CONCLUSION

Ethiopia bears international responsibility for these attacks. By launching, hosting or enabling armed drone operations from its sovereign territory against Sudan, Ethiopia is using force against the territorial integrity of Sudan in breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Its conduct falls squarely within the acts of aggression defined in Article 3(f) and 3(g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), and violates Article 4(f) and 4(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Republic of Sudan will lodge a formal complaint against the States involved and reserves in full its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

What Sudan demands

- The **immediate cessation** of all drone launches from Ethiopian territory and the closure of the launch facilities at Asosa, the Kurmuk–Gizen border sector and Bahir Dar to RSF and third-party operations.
- The **dismantling** of the RSF training camp at Menge and the withdrawal of all support to the militia.
- Immediate and effective measures by the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council to ensure full compliance by all Member States with international law, particularly the obligations of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- **Accountability and reparation** for the deaths, injuries and destruction caused.

1 · Context: A War Waged on the Sudanese State from Abroad

1.1 A militia sustained by foreign supply lines

Since April 2023 the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has waged war on the Sudanese State and its people. The militia's capacity to fight has never rested on domestic resources alone. In January 2024 the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan described as credible the reports of UAE arms deliveries to the RSF through eastern Chad.[1] Further reports from the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission and other sources document the networks sustaining this external support. In September 2026, the Mission found reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational network supplied the RSF with weapons, logistical assistance, training and foreign personnel. It further found that individuals and entities operating from, registered in, or linked to the UAE played a significant role in financing and deploying foreign military contractors and providing military-related support to the RSF.[2] In January 2025, the United States Treasury had already sanctioned UAE-based Capital Tap Holding and associated companies, stating that Capital Tap had supplied the RSF with money and weapons.[3] In May 2025, Amnesty International identified Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and AH-4 howitzers used by the RSF, concluding that these weapons had almost certainly been re-exported to the possession of the RSF by the UAE.[4]

Further investigations identify military preparation and support activities on Ethiopian territory. In February 2026, Reuters reported an RSF training camp at Menge, citing an Ethiopian security note that identified the Ethiopian National Defence Force's defence-intelligence chief as responsible for establishing it. Eight sources attributed financing, trainers and logistical support to the UAE.[5] In June 2026, Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab documented continuing activity at an Ethiopian military base in Asosa consistent with military support to the RSF. Its satellite and open-source analysis identified the transport and modification of vehicles, including repainting and possible weapons mounting, consistent with equipping RSF forces operating in Blue Nile State.[6]

As the RSF lost ground on the battlefield, its sponsors turned to the drone: a weapon that can be launched from beyond Sudan's borders, by operators beyond the reach of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The consequences for civilians have been devastating. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded that drone strikes caused at least 880 civilian deaths between January

[1] United Nations, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan*, S/2024/65, 15 January 2024.

[2] United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, *Fuelling Sudan's conflict: weapons, fighters and external support networks*, A/HRC/63/23, 1 September 2026, paras. 97–98 and 125.

[3] United States Department of the Treasury, *Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader, Weapons Supplier, and Related Companies*, 7 January 2025.

[4] Amnesty International, *Sudan: Advanced Chinese weaponry provided by UAE identified in breach of arms embargo—new investigation*, 8 May 2025.

[5] Giulia Paravicini and Reade Levinson, Reuters, *Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say*, 10 February 2026, updated 11 February 2026.

[6] Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, *Evidence of Continued Support to RSF Forces at ENDF Base in Asosa*, Situation Report No. 76, 10 June 2026, pp. 3–7.

and April 2026 — more than 80 per cent of all conflict-related civilian deaths in that period — and more than 1,000 by the end of May. In the first three weeks of October 2026 alone, drone strikes killed at least 306 people.[7] The drone has become the principal instrument of killing in Sudan and, as this report demonstrates, a growing share of these drones is launched from Ethiopia.

1.2 The opening of an eastern front

On 25 January 2026 the RSF and the al-Hilu faction of the SPLM-N opened an offensive against Blue Nile State along the Ethiopian border. Kurmuk fell in March and was liberated by the Sudanese Armed Forces on 8 July 2026. Nearly 100,000 people have been displaced in Blue Nile State this year.[8] The offensive did not come from nowhere: it was prepared, staged and supplied from the Ethiopian side of the border, where a training camp for RSF fighters had been under construction since 2025 (Section 7).

1.3 Sudan's restraint and Ethiopia's denials

Sudan has responded with restraint and through diplomatic channels. On 3 March 2026 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that drones had been launched from Ethiopia, describing the launches as a flagrant violation of Sudanese sovereignty.[9] On 5 May 2026, after drones struck Khartoum International Airport days after it received its first international flight in three years, Sudan presented evidence that the drones had been launched from Bahir Dar and recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa.[10] On 28 October 2026 Sudan presented the wreckage, flight data and incident log reproduced in this report.

Ethiopia's answer has been a bare denial, coupled with counter-accusations. It has not offered verification, has not explained the activity documented at its airfields, and has not addressed a single item of the physical evidence. A denial is not a rebuttal.

[7] OHCHR briefing on drone attacks in Sudan, May 2026; statement of the High Commissioner, June 2026 (reported by the Associated Press); OHCHR figures for 1–21 October 2026 reported by allAfrica, 23 October 2026.

[8] United Nations figures cited by Al Jazeera, "Drone strike kills 30 people in Sudan's Blue Nile region", 9 October 2026.

[9] *The National*, "Sudanese government says drone attack launched from Ethiopia", 3 March 2026.

[10] Al Jazeera, "Sudan blames Ethiopia, UAE for recent drone attacks: What we know", 6 May 2026; Reuters, 5 May 2026.




Figure 1. From build-up to bombardment: the sequence of events, August 2025 – October 2026. Left: activity on Ethiopian soil and attacks on Sudan. Right: physical evidence, independent findings and Sudan's diplomatic response.

2 · Method and Standard of Proof

The Government of Sudan is providing five categories of evidence. Each finding in this report is supported by at least two of them.

Category	What it consists of	Where it appears
Physical	Wreckage of drones shot down over Sudan; serial-numbered components; warheads; fibre-optic control spools	Exhibits A, B, C
Digital	Mission data extracted from on-board flight computers: waypoints, altitudes, commands, take-off coordinates	Exhibit A
Geospatial	Satellite imagery of launch facilities; reconstructed flight tracks; geolocation against UN and national boundary datasets; range calculations	Exhibits A, B, E
Operational record	Sudanese Military Intelligence log of seventy attacks: date, target, launch area, weapon type and quantity, losses	Exhibit D, Annex A
Independent third-party	Reuters investigation (February 2026); Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (April and June 2026); Janes; United Nations human-rights reporting; international wire services; open-source satellite monitoring	Exhibit E

HOW LAUNCH AREAS ARE ATTRIBUTED

The incident log attributes each attack to a launch area on the basis of the weapon type and its range, the observed direction and track of approach, data recovered from wreckage, and the location of known launch infrastructure. Short-range systems (25–30 km) can only reach their targets from within that radius; strategic drones require a runway, satellite communications and a ground-control station, which exist on the Ethiopian side only at established airfields.

3 · Exhibit A — The Flight Computer that Took Off in Ethiopia

The single most decisive item of evidence is a flight computer. It records, in its own memory, where the drone that carried it took off. That place is in Ethiopia.

3.1 Recovery

On 20 September 2026 the Sudanese Armed Forces brought down a long-range, fixed-wing one-way attack drone at Ad-Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State. The aircraft has a wingspan of 5.3 m and a fuselage length of 3.2 m, is powered by a petrol engine, carries a 35 kg explosive warhead, is fitted with an anti-jamming module and has a range of about 1,000 km. Its autopilot — the flight-control computer that stores and executes the pre-programmed mission — was recovered from the wreckage and its memory extracted by Sudanese specialists.



The airframe as it came down at Ad-Damazin, 20 September 2026



The recovered autopilot (flight-control computer)

Figure 2. Exhibit A: the long-range one-way attack drone and its flight-control computer.

3.2 What the memory contains

The autopilot holds a complete mission of twelve items, written in the standard MAVLink mission format used by open-architecture flight controllers. The mission defines a take-off, a climb, a cruise at 1,400 m, a programmed servo command and a terminal descent onto a target in the Ad-Damazin area.

Table 1. The mission stored in the recovered autopilot.

Item	Command	Coordinates	Altitude	Function
0	NAV_WAYPOINT (home)	—	0 m	Reference position set before launch
1	**NAV_TAKEOFF**	**10.7219975° N, 34.7662300° E**	80 m	**Take-off — on Ethiopian territory**; climb at an initial 8° pitch
2	NAV_WAYPOINT	10.7343203° N, 34.7437477° E	300 m	Steep climb — still over Ethiopian territory

Item	Command	Coordinates	Altitude	Function
3	DO_MOUNT_CONTROL	—	300 m	Camera gimbal set: roll −180°, pitch and yaw 0°
4	NAV_WAYPOINT	10.8584266° N, 34.7004890° E	1,400 m	Main climb completed — now over Sudan
5	NAV_WAYPOINT	11.0685813° N, 34.5410156° E	1,400 m	Cruise
6	NAV_WAYPOINT	11.2928944° N, 34.3988800° E	1,400 m	Cruise
7	DO_SET_SERVO	—	1,400 m	Servo channel 7 actuated (PWM 2000): payload or device activation
8	NAV_WAYPOINT	11.4726226° N, 34.2982864° E	1,400 m	Cruise
9	NAV_WAYPOINT	11.6295388° N, 34.2193222° E	1,400 m	North-western turning point
10	NAV_WAYPOINT	11.6938019° N, 34.2709494° E	1,188 m	Descent begins towards the target
11	NAV_LAND	11.7352399° N, 34.3167910° E	488 m	Terminal approach on the target

3.3 Geolocation of the take-off point

The drone took off from Ethiopian territory. This conclusion rests on clear and mutually confirming evidence, and admits no other reading.

The take-off coordinates — 10.7219975° N, 34.7662300° E — lie near the Ethiopian locality of Gizen, opposite the Sudanese district of Geissan. Their location on the Ethiopian side of the boundary is established by three independent means:

1. **The aircraft's own record.** The coordinates are not an estimate or a reconstruction. They are the take-off position written into the mission stored in the drone's flight-control computer, recovered from the wreckage at Ad-Damazin.
2. **Satellite geolocation.** Plotted on satellite imagery, the coordinates place the take-off point on the Ethiopian side of the boundary, beside Gizen (Figure 4).
3. **Measurement against two boundary datasets.** The Government of Sudan measured the coordinates against the administrative boundary of Sudan maintained for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and against the national boundary of Ethiopia.[11] Both datasets agree: the take-off point lies **1.7 km inside Ethiopia** and 1.8 km beyond the boundary of Sudan.

The conclusion does not rest on a single point. The take-off, the climb to the second waypoint at 300 m — itself between 2.3 and 3.4 km inside Ethiopia — and the first ten kilometres of the programmed route all lie over Ethiopian territory; the drone was programmed to enter Sudanese

[11] Boundaries: Sudan administrative boundaries (Information Management Working Group/OCHA, 2020) and Ethiopia national boundary (Africa Open Data, 2016), both as distributed by the geoBoundaries project (William & Mary). Distances computed by the Government of Sudan.

airspace only **about ten kilometres after take-off**. The launch site lies **65 km from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam**, in one of the most closely guarded security zones in Ethiopia.






Figure 3. The recovered flight plan plotted on the Sudan–Ethiopia border. The take-off point (WP1) and the first climb waypoint (WP2) lie inside Ethiopia. The map also shows Asosa Airport, the Menge camp and the Ethiopian Kurmuk launch sector with its 30 km reach.



Take-off point geolocated on satellite imagery, near Gizen, Ethiopia



The full route from take-off to target

Figure 4. Original geolocation (satellite imagery).

3.4 Integrity of the data

A fabricated or corrupted flight plan would betray itself. This one does not. Three independent checks confirm its integrity:




Figure 5. Chain of evidence from wreckage to verdict, with the three integrity checks performed by the Government of Sudan.

- **Route length.** Summing the great-circle distances between the nine positional waypoints gives 134.04 km — identical, to the hundredth of a kilometre, to the figure reported.
- **Flight profile.** The altitudes form a coherent operational profile: a climb to 300 m, a climb to a 1,400 m cruise, and a staged descent onto the target. The commands are correctly sequenced.
- **Geography.** Every waypoint after the border crossing lies inside Sudan along a direct corridor to Ad-Damazin; the target point lies in the Ad-Damazin area, where the aircraft was brought down.




Figure 6. Programmed altitude profile of the recovered mission. The first ten kilometres of the flight were planned over Ethiopian territory.

3.5 What Exhibit A proves

FINDING A

The drone that attacked Ad-Damazin on 20 September 2026 was launched from Ethiopian territory. Its pre-programmed mission records a take-off point 1.7 km inside Ethiopia; satellite geolocation and two independent boundary datasets confirm it. Its operators stood on Ethiopian soil, 65 km from the GERD, in a zone under the full control of the Ethiopian security forces. This is not inference. It is the aircraft's own record — confirmed.

4 · Exhibit B — Strategic Drones from Bahir Dar Air Base

Sudan has been attacked not only by expendable drones, but by armed strategic drones of a class that only States possess. They flew from Bahir Dar Air Base, an installation of the Ethiopian National Defence Force.

4.1 Bahir Dar Air Base

Bahir Dar, on the southern shore of Lake Tana in the Amhara Region, hosts an Ethiopian Air Force base used for armed-drone operations. Satellite imagery reviewed by Sudan identifies the apron and hangars from which the strategic drones were prepared, the taxi route and the take-off runway.



Bahir Dar Air Base: the drone apron (circled) and runway



Pre-flight preparation area, taxi route and take-off run

Figure 7. Bahir Dar Air Base, Amhara Region, Ethiopia (satellite imagery annotated by Military Intelligence).


4.2 The El Obeid interception, 17 March 2026

On Tuesday 17 March 2026 Sudanese air defences brought down a Bayraktar Akıncı strategic drone near El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan. Data recovered from the aircraft showed that it had been launched from the Bahir Dar area — on 1 and 17 March — to strike positions in several Sudanese states.[12] The reconstructed track reveals the method: the aircraft flew west across Blue Nile State, entered the airspace of South Sudan to skirt Sudanese air defences, and then turned north through Kordofan to its targets — a route of about 1,000 km planned by a professional air-operations staff.

[12] Statement of the SAF spokesperson, Brigadier General Asim Awad Abdelwahab, Khartoum, 5 May 2026, reported by Al Jazeera and Reuters.



Recovered track: Bahir Dar to North Kordofan



Detail of the track over Kordofan, including the attack orbit

Figure 8. Flight track of the Akıncı downed near El Obeid, as recovered and plotted by Military Intelligence.




Figure 9. The theatre of operations: launch bases on Ethiopian territory, the attributed launch–target relationships, the reconstructed Bahir Dar–El Obeid track through South Sudanese airspace, and the number of logged incidents by area.


4.3 The Ad-Damazin interception, 23 May 2026

On Saturday 23 May 2026 a second Akıncı was brought down near Ad-Damazin, about 75 km from the Ethiopian border, after entering Sudanese airspace from Ethiopia. It was intercepted by a Sudanese Akıncı.[13] Its engine, satellite communications equipment and avionics were recovered.

[13] *Militarnyi*, "Sudanese Army Shot Down Bayraktar Akinci That Flew in From Ethiopia Using Its Own Akinci", 23 May 2026; *Military Africa*, 24 May 2026.



Wreckage of the Akıncı downed near El Obeid, 17 March 2026



Engine of the Akıncı downed near Ad-Damazin, 23 May 2026

Figure 10. Akıncı wreckage recovered in Sudan.

4.4 Serial-numbered components

The wreckage carries manufacturer data plates. Each bears the NATO Commercial and Government Entity code **T9710**, a part number and an individual serial number. One plate carries a NATO Stock Number with the country code 27 (Türkiye). These identifiers allow the manufacturer and the exporting State to establish, from their own records, the airframe to which each component belongs and the customer to which it was delivered.

Table 2. Baykar and Aselsan components identified in Akıncı wreckage. The Link B3 transceiver also bears NATO Stock Number 5820-27-063-3073.

Component (as labelled)	Part number	Serial number	NCAGE	Recovered at
Panel, Control, Type 2 (Gövde Yan)	131100056	241200054	T9710	El Obeid, 17 Mar
Computer, Navigation (Bilgisayar, Seyrüsefer)	134600002	250100140	T9710	El Obeid, 17 Mar
Air Data Terminal Unit Set, Link B2 (HVT)	143100084	231200572	T9710	El Obeid, 17 Mar
Central Unit, Airborne Radio (Kontrol Ünitesi)	143100953	250200003	T9710	Ad-Damazin, 23 May
Transceiver Unit, Link B3, Airborne	10-1108010100	240400695	T9710	Ad-Damazin, 23 May
Communications unit (Aselsan)	—	—	—	El Obeid and Ad-Damazin



Control panel plate



Navigation computer plate



Air data terminal plate



Bayraktar Akıncı marking on the control panel



Link B3 airborne transceiver



Central control unit



Satellite communications antenna



Aselsan communications system



Flight-control unit

Figure 11. Manufacturer plates and major components recovered from the Akıncı wreckage.

4.5 Strategic drones shot down

#	Date	Location	Type	Launch site
1	Tuesday 17 March 2026	El Obeid, North Kordofan	Bayraktar Akıncı	Bahir Dar, Ethiopia
2	Saturday 23 May 2026	Ad-Damazin, Blue Nile	Bayraktar Akıncı	Bahir Dar, Ethiopia
3	Sunday 23 August 2026	Dindiro, Blue Nile	Bayraktar Akıncı	Ethiopia
4	Monday 12 October 2026	Wad el-Mahi, Blue Nile	Bayraktar TB2	Ethiopia
5	Thursday 22 October 2026	Bikori, Blue Nile	Bayraktar TB2	Ethiopia

4.6 Why a strategic drone points to a State

The Akıncı is not a militia weapon. It is a twin-engine strategic aircraft with a wingspan of about twenty metres and a take-off weight of around six tonnes. It requires a paved runway, a ground-control station, satellite communications, a supply chain of manufacturer-supported spare parts, and aircrews trained by the manufacturer. Türkiye exports it only to sovereign governments, under end-use undertakings.

Ethiopia is a declared operator. The Ethiopian Air Force received Bayraktar Akıncı aircraft in a public ceremony at Harar Meda Air Base in January 2024, in the presence of the Chief of General Staff, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula; it has operated Bayraktar TB2 drones since the Tigray war.[14] The Rapid Support Forces possess no runway in eastern Sudan, no satellite ground segment and no Akıncı crews.

FINDING B

Armed strategic drones of a type exported only to governments, and operated by the Ethiopian Air Force, flew from Bahir Dar Air Base to attack Sudan. Whether flown by Ethiopian crews or by a third State's crews using an Ethiopian air base, the attacks were launched from Ethiopia's sovereign territory and from a facility under its exclusive control.

[14] *Military Africa*, "Ethiopia unveils Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jet and Akinci combat drone", 17 January 2024; *The Defense Post*, 19 January 2024.

5 · Exhibit C — The Border Arsenal: Three Classes of Attack Drone

Along the border, three classes of attack drone have been used against Blue Nile State. Their technical characteristics — above all their range — place their operators on the Ethiopian side of the boundary.

Table 3. Technical identification of the three drone classes (Military Intelligence).

Characteristic	Type 1 — FPV, fibre-optic	Type 2 — long-range fixed wing	Type 3 — short-range flying wing
Role	Tactical suicide drone	Long-range one-way attack	Tactical loitering munition
Airframe	Quadcopter, 15-inch class	5.3 m wingspan, 3.2 m fuselage	Flying wing, 2.3 m span
Propulsion	Electric	Petrol engine	Electric
Control	Fibre-optic cable — immune to jamming	Pre-programmed autopilot, anti-jam module	Datalink, camera, AI-assisted target tracking
Range	About 30 km (cable length)	About 1,000 km	25–30 km
Warhead	Explosive charge (RPG-type warhead in reference configuration)	35 kg	3–5 kg
First observed	Start of the Blue Nile offensive	Start of the Blue Nile offensive	September 2026 (Bulang, Um Darfa, Khor Baraka)
Wreckage recovered	Kurmuk, Al-Baraka, Dindiro, 28 Jul 2026	Ad-Damazin, 20 Sep 2026	Bulang, 4 Oct; Um Darfa, 7 Oct 2026

5.1 Type 1 — Fibre-optic FPV suicide drones

These first-person-view drones are steered through a fibre-optic cable that unspools behind the aircraft. They cannot be jammed but they also cannot fly further than the cable is long. The spool recovered at the Blue Nile front carries a manufacturer's qualification certificate for G.657.A2 fibre with a length of 30 km. The operator must therefore be within 30 km of the target, physically connected to the drone by cable.



Reference configuration



Wreckage, Blue Nile front



Fibre spool and trailing cable



Spool certificate: G.657.A2 fibre, 30 km

Figure 12. Type 1: fibre-optic FPV suicide drone (wreckage collected at Kurmuk, Al-Baraka and Dindiro, 28 July 2026).

5.2 Type 2 — Long-range one-way attack drone

The long-range drone is the aircraft whose flight computer is analysed in Exhibit A. Its 1,000 km range places every major Sudanese city within reach of the Ethiopian border: from Asosa, Khartoum lies 657 km away and El Obeid 592 km.



35 kg warhead



Flight controller



Avionics and wiring



Anti-jam and control modules

Figure 13. Type 2: long-range one-way attack drone (wreckage collected at Ad-Damazin, 20 September 2026).

5.3 Type 3 — Short-range AI-enabled flying wing

First observed in September 2026, this electric flying wing carries a camera, a datalink and an artificial-intelligence module for target identification and tracking — features not found on the other one-way drones used against Sudan. Its range of 25–30 km again requires a launch position close to the target.



Airframe recovered at Bulang



Equipment bay: datalink module



Equipment bay: flight controller and camera

Figure 14. Type 3: short-range flying wing with AI-assisted target tracking (wreckage collected at Bulang, 4 October, and Um Darfa, 7 October 2026).

5.4 The physics of range

After the Sudanese Armed Forces liberated Kurmuk on 8 July 2026, the towns and army positions of the border sector were once again held by Sudanese forces. Yet from 21 July onwards, Kurmuk, Al-Baraka, Al-Kaili and Dindiro were struck again and again by salvos of short-range suicide drones — 27 in July, 43 in September and 69 in October. A drone with a 30 km reach must be launched within 30 km of its target, and the 30 km envelope around these positions extends deep into Ethiopia (see the border map in Exhibit A). Drawing on the direction of approach, the recovered wreckage and the weapons' range, the incident log attributes these salvos to the Ethiopian side of Kurmuk, directly across the boundary. The salvos that struck Ad-Damazin, Khartoum and Omdurman lie far beyond a 30 km reach; they belong to the long-range class analysed in Exhibit A.

FINDING C

Three distinct classes of attack drone are in use on the Blue Nile front. The short-range classes cannot reach their targets except from positions within 30 km; the long-range class carries in its memory a take-off point inside Ethiopia. The arsenal is Ethiopia-based.

6 · Exhibit D — The Record of Attacks and the Human Toll

Sudanese Intelligence Services have logged seventy drone attacks launched from Ethiopian territory between 15 February and 27 October 2026. The record shows a campaign that is escalating, widening and deliberately aimed at civilian life.

6.1 Escalation

The campaign began with isolated strikes by strategic drones from Asosa in February. From July it was joined by massed salvos of suicide drones from the Ethiopian side of Kurmuk. **October 2026 alone accounts for 28 of the 70 attacks and 97 of the 187 suicide drones recorded** — more suicide drones than in all previous months combined.




Figure 15. Monthly incidents by weapon class (left) and weapons expended (right), February–October 2026. Derived from the incident log in Annex A.

6.2 Geography

Fifty of the attacks struck Blue Nile State — its capital Ad-Damazin, the displaced-persons site at Wad el-Mahi and the border localities of Kurmuk, Al-Baraka, Al-Kaili, Dindiro, Geissan, Bout and Um Darfa. The remaining twenty reached far into the interior: Khartoum (five attacks, including the international airport), North Kordofan (seven, including El Obeid, Er Rahad and Umm Ruwaba), White Nile State (three, including the Um Dabakir and Tendalti power stations), Sennar State, South Kordofan, a coordinated strike on five power stations across Sennar, Gedaref, White Nile and Gezira states, and an Akıncı sortie against army positions in several states.

6.3 Consolidated casualties

Table 4. Consolidated casualty figures, as presented by the Sudanese authorities at the joint press conference of 28 October 2026.

Weapon class	Civilians killed or wounded	Military killed	Military wounded
Strategic drones	270	87	108
Suicide drones	214	89	92
Total	**484**	**176**	**200**

Beyond the human toll, the attacks destroyed or damaged schools, twelve fuel stations, seventeen civilian homes, the hospital at Um Darfa, a tanker depot at Um Alila, the residences of the Governor of Blue Nile Region and of senior State officials, and six power stations.

6.4 Wad el-Mahi, 9 October 2026: the massacre at Abu Shendi

On Friday 9 October 2026 suicide drones launched from Ethiopian territory struck displaced civilians at the Abu Shendi area of Wad el-Mahi locality, beside an informal gold-mining site where displaced women work. **Thirty people were killed — twenty-six women and four children — and one hundred were wounded.** Witnesses told AFP that survivors buried twenty-six women and four children. The Governor of the area stated that the drone had been launched from inside Ethiopia.[15] It is the deadliest single attack recorded in the incident log (Annex A).

[15] Al Jazeera, “Drone strike kills 30 people in Sudan’s Blue Nile region”, 9 October 2026; *Asharq Al-Awsat* (AFP), “26 Women, 4 Children Killed in Sudan RSF Drone Strike”, 9 October 2026; Military Intelligence Authority.



Figure 16. Wounded survivors of the drone attack on displaced civilians at Abu Shendi, Wad el-Mahi, 9 October 2026.

6.5 Khartoum, 19 October 2026: three children killed

On 19 October 2026 suicide drones attacked Khartoum International Airport and the adjoining residential districts of Burri and Nasser Extension. A drone struck a family home and killed three children aged two, four and six.[16] The incident log records four suicide drones launched from Ethiopian territory in this attack. The Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General declared the United Nations alarmed by the continued deadly drone strikes killing civilians, including children.[17]

6.6 Ad-Damazin and Um Darfa: a capital under siege

Throughout September and October, Ad-Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State, was attacked repeatedly: the State Government headquarters (14 suicide drones, 13 September), Ad-Damazin Airport, the residences of the Regional Governor and of the Commander of the 4th Infantry Division (10 suicide drones, 3 October), and the homes of the State spokesperson and of the Minister of Finance (7 October: five civilians killed, ten wounded). On 11 October suicide drones destroyed the hospital at Um Darfa and a fuel station.

[16] Xinhua, “4 people, including 3 children, killed in drone attacks on Sudanese capital Khartoum”, 20 October 2026; *The Washington Post*, 19 October 2026; *Sudan Tribune*, “Three Children Killed in RSF Drone Strike Near Khartoum Airport”, October 2026.

[17] Al Jazeera, “Drone attacks across Sudan escalate, 160 people reported killed”, 19 October 2026.

6.7 The national power grid

From late October the campaign turned against the infrastructure on which every Sudanese household depends. On 26 October 2026 strategic drones launched from Asosa struck five power stations in a single wave — Singa (Sennar), Al-Fao and Al-Hawata (Gedaref), Mashkour (White Nile) and the Al-Junaid transformer station (Gezira) — putting all five out of service. On 27 October suicide drones destroyed two main transformers at the Al-Markhiyat station in Omdurman, leaving large parts of the capital without electricity for more than twelve hours.[18] Electricity drives water pumping, hospitals and food storage; its destruction strikes directly at objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. The full record of attacks on the grid is set out in Annex B.

THE PURPOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN

The pattern of targets — the reopened Khartoum airport, residential districts, hospitals, displaced-persons sites and the power grid — reveals the purpose: to terrorise civilians, to prevent the return of the displaced to Khartoum and the liberated areas, and to break the functioning of the Sudanese State. These are war crimes, and those who launch them bear responsibility for them.

[18] Associated Press, “Large parts of Sudan’s capital lose power after drone attack”, 27 October 2026; Radio Tamazuj, 28 October 2026.

7 · Exhibit E — Independent Corroboration

Sudan's evidence does not stand alone. Independent investigators, working from separate sources, have reached the same conclusions.

7.1 Reuters: an RSF camp built by Ethiopia's defence intelligence

On 10 February 2026 Reuters published an investigation, based on fifteen sources and satellite imagery, establishing that Ethiopia had built a secret camp in the Menge district of Benishangul-Gumuz to train RSF fighters.[19] Among its findings:

- The camp lies about 32 km from the Sudanese border and about 101 km from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. A diplomatic cable put its capacity at up to 10,000 fighters; an internal Ethiopian security note recorded **4,300 RSF fighters in training** in early January 2026.
- According to that security note, confirmed by a senior Ethiopian official and four diplomatic and security sources, the camp was set up by **General Getachew Gudina, Chief of the Defence Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defence Force**.
- Satellite imagery showed more than 640 tents by 24 November 2025; Ethiopian officials described columns of 56 and 70 trucks carrying trainees in November 2025.
- At **Asosa Airport**, 53 km from the camp, new construction since August 2025 included a hangar, paved aprons and — as identified by a military-technology expert of the Dutch organisation PAX — **a UAV ground-control station and a satellite antenna**. Senior Ethiopian officials told Reuters that the military planned to turn the airport into a drone operations centre.
- Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, stated that the United Arab Emirates financed the camp and provided trainers and logistics; trucks of an Emirati logistics firm were seen driving through Asosa towards the camp.

The Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee publicly expressed concern at the reports the same day.[20]

7.2 Yale Humanitarian Research Lab: "clear visual evidence"

In April 2026 the Humanitarian Research Lab of the Yale School of Public Health reported that satellite imagery and open-source data showed activity consistent with military assistance to the RSF at an Ethiopian army base in Asosa between late December 2025 and late March 2026, and that its findings represented clear visual evidence, over a five-month period, that RSF attacks on Blue Nile State were launched from inside Ethiopia. Commercial car carriers unloaded armed pickup trucks at the base; similar vehicles later appeared in the fighting around Kurmuk, about

[19] Reuters, "Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say", 10 February 2026 (as published by *Arab News Japan* and *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 10–11 February 2026).

[20] Geeska, "Alleged UAE-linked RSF training facility in Ethiopia draws U.S. concern", 11 February 2026.

100 km away by road. The Lab also documented a significant expansion of Asosa Airport, including a new hangar, a concrete pad and defensive fighting positions.[21]

7.3 Cargo flights into Asosa

Open-source satellite monitoring between 20 August and 7 September 2026 recorded about four Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo aircraft linked to the United Arab Emirates parked at Asosa Airport, with flights originating from Al Ain, followed by the build-up and subsequent dispersal of military supplies and armed vehicles at the Ethiopian army base.[22]

7.4 Convergence of the evidence

Table 5. Every principal element of Sudan's case is independently corroborated.

Element	Sudan's evidence	Independent confirmation
Asosa is a drone base	Incident log: most strategic-drone launches attributed to Asosa	Reuters: UAV ground-control station and satellite antenna at Asosa Airport; Yale HRL: airport expansion; cargo flights tracked
RSF forces are staged in Ethiopia	Ground attacks on Blue Nile from across the border	Reuters: 4,300 RSF trainees at Menge; Yale HRL: attacks launched from inside Ethiopia
Ethiopian State involvement	Launches from ENDF facilities at Asosa and Bahir Dar	Reuters: camp set up by the ENDF Defence Intelligence chief
Akıncı operations from Ethiopia	Wreckage, flight data and serial numbers from two Akıncı	Ethiopia publicly inducted the Akıncı in January 2024; Janes reports the identification of the downed aircraft as Akıncı[23]
Civilian harm	484 civilian casualties logged; Wad el-Mahi, Khartoum, power grid	AFP, Al Jazeera, AP and Xinhua reporting; OHCHR: drones the leading cause of civilian deaths

[21] AFP, "Ethiopia army base used to support Sudan paramilitary: report", 9 April 2026, reporting the findings of the Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab.

[22] Frontlines.et conflict monitor, events recorded at Asosa, August–October 2026 (open-source satellite monitoring, graded B: verified by one independent source).

[23] Janes, "Sudan claims numerous UAV attacks launched from Ethiopia", 30 October 2026.

8 · Attribution: Why Responsibility Rests with Ethiopia

8.1 Ethiopia controls the launch zones

None of the launch areas identified in this report is an ungoverned space. Asosa Airport is an installation of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) undergoing a military upgrade. Bahir Dar Air Base is an Ethiopian Air Force base. The Gizen take-off point lies 65 km from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, in a border zone that Ethiopia guards as vital national infrastructure; the Menge camp lies 101 km from the dam. Convoys of dozens of trucks, hundreds of tents, construction machinery passing daily through Asosa and cargo aircraft landing at its airport cannot escape the notice of the State that controls the ground. Ethiopia knew and could not but know what was being launched from its territory.

8.2 Every pathway of responsibility leads to Ethiopia

Table 6. Three possible operating arrangements; one responsible State.

If the drones are flown by Ethiopian forces	If Ethiopia lends its bases to a third State	If Ethiopia hosts and equips the RSF
The conduct of the ENDF is the conduct of Ethiopia itself (Article 4, ILC Articles on State Responsibility). Ethiopia is directly using force against Sudan.	Allowing territory placed at the disposal of another State to be used for aggression against a third State is itself an act of aggression (Article 3(f), resolution 3314). Ethiopia is responsible for aiding or assisting the wrongful act (Article 16, ILC Articles).	Sending, harbouring, training or supporting armed bands that carry out armed force against another State is aggression and unlawful intervention (Article 3(g), resolution 3314; ICJ, Nicaragua, 1986). Ethiopia is in breach of its duty not to allow its territory to be used against the rights of Sudan (ICJ, Corfu Channel, 1949).

8.3 Denial is not an answer

Ethiopia has dismissed Sudan's evidence as baseless and has accused Sudan of supporting armed opposition to the Ethiopian Government.[24] Neither response engages with the evidence. No explanation has been offered for the take-off coordinates in the recovered flight computer, for Akıncı aircraft flying from Bahir Dar, for the ground-control station at Asosa or for the RSF camp at Menge. A counter-accusation would not justify the use of force against Sudan: international law knows no defence of reciprocal wrongdoing. Sudan's door to verification remains open; Ethiopia has chosen not to walk through it.

[24] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, statement of 5 May 2026, reported by Al Jazeera and Radio Tamazuj, 5–6 May 2026.

9 · Legal Assessment

9.1 Use of force and aggression

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Armed drone strikes against Sudanese cities, military positions and infrastructure, launched from Ethiopian territory, are uses of force against Sudan.

General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), the Definition of Aggression, lists among acts of aggression:

- Article 3(f): the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; and
- Article 3(g): the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against another State, or its substantial involvement therein.

The International Court of Justice has recognised Article 3(g) as reflecting customary international law, and has held that arming and training armed groups for use against another State constitutes a use of force.[25] In *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo*, the Court found that a State's military, logistical and financial support to irregular forces operating in a neighbour's territory violated both the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention.[26]

9.2 Non-intervention and the duty of vigilance

The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations (resolution 2625 (XXV)) obliges every State to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife in another State, or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts. Since *Corfu Channel*, every State is bound not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.[27] Unlike a State unable to control remote frontier areas, Ethiopia exercises full control over the airfields and the security zone from which these attacks are launched.

9.3 African Union law

The Constitutive Act of the African Union establishes the prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States (Article 4(f)) and non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another (Article 4(g)). The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (Abuja, 2005) defines aggression, in Article 1(c), to include allowing a State's

[25] ICJ, *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, paras. 195 and 228.

[26] ICJ, *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, paras. 161–165.

[27] ICJ, *Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania)*, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 22.

territory to be used for aggression against another State and the provision of support to armed groups and mercenaries that carry out hostile acts against a Member State.

9.4 International humanitarian law

The attacks documented in this report struck civilians, hospitals, homes and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, in violation of the principles of distinction and proportionality (Additional Protocol I, Articles 48, 51, 52 and 54) and the corresponding rules of customary international law. Ethiopia, a party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, is bound by Common Article 1 to respect and to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. A State that provides the launch platform for attacks on civilians does the opposite.

9.5 Consequences

Ethiopia's internationally wrongful conduct entails the obligations to cease it, to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and to make full reparation for the injury caused (Articles 30 and 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility).

The Republic of Sudan will seize the competent organs. It will lodge a formal complaint against the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and against every other State found to have participated in, financed or facilitated these attacks, before the United Nations Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council and all competent international and regional bodies. Sudan's recourse to these mechanisms is an act of legality, not a renunciation of its rights: should they prove unable or unwilling to enforce international law, Sudan will exercise in full its inherent right of individual self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

LEGAL CONCLUSION

Ethiopia has used, or has permitted the use of, its territory and its military facilities for armed attacks against the Republic of Sudan. This conduct is a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, constitutes aggression within the meaning of Article 3(f) and 3(g) of resolution 3314 (XXIX), breaches the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and makes Ethiopia complicit in grave violations of international humanitarian law.

10 · Questions and Answers

Q. Could the drones have been launched from inside Sudan by the RSF or its allies?

No. The flight computer of the drone that attacked Ad-Damazin records a take-off point 1.7 km inside Ethiopia and a route that remains over Ethiopian territory for its first ten kilometres. The Akıncı strategic drones require runways, satellite links and ground-control stations that exist only at established airfields; the El Obeid track originated at Bahir Dar. After the liberation of Kurmuk on 8 July, short-range drones with a 30 km reach continued to strike the town and the surrounding army positions from beyond Sudanese lines — from the Ethiopian side of the boundary.

Q. Could the flight data have been fabricated or altered?

The data passes every test of internal consistency. The route length recomputed from the raw coordinates matches the reported figure to the hundredth of a kilometre; the altitude profile and command sequence form a coherent operational mission; the target coordinates correspond to the area where the aircraft was brought down. The hardware is available for independent forensic examination.

Q. The Sudanese Army itself operates Turkish drones. Could the downed Akıncı have been Sudanese?

No. A Sudanese aircraft does not take off from an Ethiopian air base, does not route through South Sudanese airspace to evade Sudanese air defences, and does not attack Sudanese cities. The Akıncı downed near Ad-Damazin on 23 May was intercepted by a Sudanese Akıncı. The serial numbers on the recovered components allow the manufacturer and the exporting State to identify the end-user of each aircraft in a matter of hours; Sudan formally invites investigators to ask Türkiye to do so.

Q. Ethiopia denies the accusations and says Sudan supports Ethiopian armed opposition. Does that change the analysis?

No. A denial that does not address the evidence carries no weight against wreckage, flight data and satellite imagery. A counter-allegation, which is not substantiated, provides no legal justification for armed attacks against Sudan. Sudan calls for independent verification.

Q. Could these activities have occurred without the knowledge of the Ethiopian Government?

No. The launch sites are an ENDF airfield at Asosa, an Ethiopian Air Force base at Bahir Dar, and a border zone 65 km from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. According to an internal Ethiopian security note reported by Reuters, the RSF camp at Menge was established by the Chief of Defence Intelligence of the ENDF. The scale of the activity — truck convoys, hundreds of tents, cargo flights and drone infrastructure — is incompatible with ignorance.

Q. Why does it matter who launched the drones if the RSF is the party to the conflict?

Because the territory and the facilities are Ethiopia's. Under international law, a State that places its territory at the disposal of another for aggression, or that supports armed bands attacking its neighbour, commits an internationally wrongful act of its own. The drones are not an internal Sudanese matter: they cross an international boundary.

Q. Is Sudan seeking war with Ethiopia?

No. Sudan has exercised strategic patience, has addressed Ethiopia through diplomatic channels since March 2026, has turned to the international community and will lodge a formal complaint against the States involved. Sudan does not initiate aggression against any State. But it will not accept that its territory remain a target: should the international mechanisms fail to enforce the law and bring the attacks to an end, Sudan will exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, at the time and in the manner it deems appropriate.

Q. Why must the international community act now?

Because the campaign is escalating: October 2026 alone accounts for 40 per cent of the logged attacks and more than half of all suicide drones launched. The targeting of the power grid now threatens water, health care and food security for millions. Drone operations alongside the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam add a grave risk to regional stability. Every week of silence costs Sudanese lives.

11 · Sudan's Position, Demands and Recommendations

11.1 The sovereign position of the Republic of Sudan

The Republic of Sudan has met aggression with restraint and provocation with patience. That patience must not be mistaken for acquiescence.

1. **Formal complaint.** The Republic of Sudan will lodge a formal complaint against the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and against every other State found to have financed, supplied, facilitated or participated in these attacks, before the United Nations Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council and all competent international and regional bodies.
2. **Independent examination of the evidence.** Sudan stands ready to place the recovered wreckage, the flight-control hardware, the original data and the chain-of-custody records before an independent international team of technical experts, under the auspices of the United Nations or the African Union. Sudan has nothing to conceal; it invites those who deny the evidence to examine it.
3. **Right of response.** Sudan's recourse to international mechanisms is a choice, not a limitation. Should those mechanisms prove unable or unwilling to enforce international law and bring these attacks to an end, the Republic of Sudan will exercise in full its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, at the time and in the manner it deems appropriate, and will take every measure necessary to protect its people, its territory and its sovereignty.
4. **Continued documentation.** The Government of Sudan will continue to monitor, record and document every launch, and will place further evidence before the international community as it is obtained.

11.2 To the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

1. Cease immediately all drone launches from Ethiopian territory against Sudan.
2. Close Asosa Airport, the Kurmuk–Gizen border sector and Bahir Dar Air Base to all RSF and third-party drone operations against Sudan, and remove the associated ground-control and launch infrastructure.
3. Dismantle the RSF training camp at Menge and cease all logistical, financial and military support to the militia.
4. Accept an independent international verification mission on the Sudan–Ethiopia border.
5. Make full reparation for the deaths, injuries and destruction caused.

11.3 To the United Nations Security Council

1. Convene an urgent meeting on the cross-border drone attacks against Sudan, at the request of Sudan under Article 35 of the Charter.
2. Take immediate and effective measures, in accordance with its Charter and the rules and principles of international law, to end foreign aggression against Sudan, condemn the States involved in that aggression, and uphold Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

11.4 To the African Union and IGAD

1. Convene the Peace and Security Council in emergency session and invoke the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact.
2. Call on Ethiopia, as a Member State, to honour Article 4(f) and 4(g) of the Constitutive Act.

11.5 To the United Arab Emirates

1. Respond to the independent findings that it financed and supplied the RSF camp in Ethiopia and the airlift into Asosa, and cease all support to the militia.

11.6 To the international community

1. Condemn the launching of drone attacks against Sudan from Ethiopian territory.
2. Impose targeted measures on the individuals and entities who finance, supply, host or operate the drone campaign.
3. Support accountability for the attacks on civilians, hospitals and the power grid.

THE POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

Sudan seeks peace with all its neighbours and has met provocation with patience. But no State can be asked to absorb, indefinitely, armed attacks launched from across its border. The evidence is before the international community, and the responsibility to act is now its own. The Republic of Sudan will pursue every legal avenue to hold the States involved to account — and it reserves, in full, its sovereign right to respond should international law go unenforced.

Annex A — Incident Log, 15 February – 27 October 2026

Attacks launched from Ethiopian territory as recorded by the Sudanese Government, in chronological order. "Strategic" denotes medium-altitude long-endurance armed drones (Akıncı, TB2) and the number of munitions they fired; "suicide" denotes one-way attack drones and the number launched; "Drones" marks attacks for which the source does not record the drone type.

No.	Date 2026	Target	Target State	Launch area	Weapon	Casualties & Outcome
1	15 Feb	El Mazmum	Sennar	**Asosa**	Strategic · 1 munition	1 officer, 4 soldiers and 1 civilian
2	17 Feb	Bout town	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 2 munitions	3 soldiers wounded; fuel station partly destroyed
3	19 Feb	El Mazmum	Sennar	**Asosa**	Strategic · 2 munitions	Battalion HQ destroyed; homes set on fire
4	25 Feb	Al-Silk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian border**	Suicide · 3 drones	7 soldiers wounded
5	1 Mar	Army positions in several states	Several	**Bahir Dar**	Strategic (Akıncı)	Sortie recorded in the flight data of the Akıncı downed on 17 March
6	3 Mar	El Obeid main power station	N. Kordofan	**Ethiopia**	Drones	Power station struck
7	10 Mar	Um Dabakir thermal power station	White Nile	**Ethiopia**	Drones	Two transformers set ablaze; power cut across large parts of the State
8	17 Mar	El Obeid	N. Kordofan	**Bahir Dar**	Strategic · 2 munitions	**Akıncı shot down**
9	30 Mar	Dindiro area	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 1 munition	1 combat vehicle destroyed; 3 soldiers wounded
10	26 Apr	Al-Silk	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 1 munition	7 soldiers wounded
11	1 May	El Obeid	N. Kordofan	**Ethiopia**	Strategic	Radio and TV building, police HQ, Agricultural Bank hit
12	4 May	Khartoum Airport	Khartoum	**Ethiopia**	Strategic · 3 munitions	Heavy material damage
13	22 May	Blue Nile operational force HQ	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 3 munitions	Depot hit; 10 motorcycles destroyed, 12 damaged
14	22 May	Al-Sabunabi (Wad Abuk)	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic	1 combat vehicle destroyed

No.	Date 2026	Target	Target State	Launch area	Weapon	Casualties & Outcome
15	23 May	Ad-Damazin	Blue Nile	**Bahir Dar**	Strategic · 2 munitions	**Akıncı shot down**
16	1 Jun	Kurmuk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic	Tank and combat vehicle destroyed
17	2 Jun	Al-Tabun	White Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic · 2 munitions	—
18	5 Jun	Bout	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic · 2 munitions	Brigade HQ hit
19	6 Jun	Sali, Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic	Several civilians wounded
20	8 Jun	Um Shuaifa camp, Geissan	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian border**	Strategic ×2 · 5 munitions	**1 officer and 2 soldiers killed; civilians wounded**
21	11 Jun	Sali station	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic	5 soldiers wounded
22	18 Jul	Kurmuk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic · 4 munitions	School buildings destroyed
23	20 Jul	Kurmuk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic · 3 munitions	5 soldiers wounded
24	21 Jul	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic ×2 · 5 munitions	5 soldiers wounded
25	21 Jul	Kurmuk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 7 drones	9 soldiers wounded; stores and 2 vehicles destroyed
26	24 Jul	Kurmuk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 3 drones	**1 soldier killed; 9 wounded**
27	28 Jul	Kurmuk, Al-Baraka, Dindiro	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 12 drones	**5 civilians killed; others wounded**
28	29 Jul	Kurmuk	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 5 drones	**1 soldier killed; 6 wounded**
29	23 Aug	Dindiro	Blue Nile	**Ethiopia**	Strategic (Akıncı)	**Shot down**
30	11 Sep	Al-Kaili	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian border**	Suicide · 4 drones	No losses
31	11 Sep	Jebel Kadam	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	5 soldiers wounded
32	11 Sep	Al-Kaili	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian border**	Suicide · 10 drones	2 soldiers wounded
33	12 Sep	Mining area south of Ad-Damazin	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic ×2 · 7 munitions	**1 killed; 12 civilians wounded**
34	13 Sep	Al-Kaili	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian border**	Suicide · 12 drones	**4 civilians killed**
35	13 Sep	Ad-Damazin – State Government HQ	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 14 drones	**1 soldier and 5 civilians killed; 3 fuel stations destroyed**
36	13 Sep	Ad-Damazin	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	Fuel station and school destroyed

No.	Date 2026	Target	Target State	Launch area	Weapon	Casualties & Outcome
37	14 Sep	Ad-Damazin Airport	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 2 drones	No losses
38	17 Sep	Al-Kaili	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	No losses
39	19 Sep	Al-Kaili	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 1 munition	**Munition shot down**
40	20 Sep	Ad-Damazin	Blue Nile	**Gizen, Ethiopia**	Suicide (long-range) · 1 drone	**Brought down; flight-control computer recovered (Exhibit A)**
41	26 Sep	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 8 drones	No losses
42	29 Sep	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 9 drones	No losses
43	1 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 8 drones	No losses
44	2 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 3 drones	No losses
45	3 Oct	Ad-Damazin – residences of the Regional Governor and of the 4th Infantry Division commander	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 10 drones	Both residences destroyed
46	3 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 10 drones	1 soldier wounded
47	5 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 10 drones	No losses
48	6 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 4 drones	No losses
49	7 Oct	Ad-Damazin – homes of the State spokesperson and the Minister of Finance	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 4 drones	**5 civilians killed, 10 wounded; homes damaged**
50	9 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 20 drones	No losses
51	9 Oct	Abu Shendi displaced-persons site, Wad el-Mahi	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian territory**	Suicide drones	**30 civilians killed (26 women, 4 children); 100 wounded**
52	10 Oct	Um Darfa	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 1 munition	**Soldiers killed; civilians wounded**
53	11 Oct	Um Darfa	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic · 2 munitions	**3 soldiers killed; 9 wounded**
54	11 Oct	Um Darfa	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 2 drones	Fuel station and Um Darfa Hospital destroyed
55	12 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 5 drones	No losses
56	12 Oct	Wad el-Mahi	Blue Nile	**Asosa**	Strategic (TB2)	**Shot down**

No.	Date 2026	Target	Target State	Launch area	Weapon	Casualties & Outcome
57	14 Oct	Al-Baraka	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 5 drones	No losses
58	14 Oct	Al-Kaili	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian Kurmuk**	Suicide · 4 drones	No losses
59	19 Oct	Khartoum Airport; Burri – Nasser Extension	Khartoum	**Ethiopian territory**	Suicide · 4 drones	**3 children killed**
60	20 Oct	Khartoum Airport	Khartoum	**Ethiopian territory**	Suicide · 3 drones	No losses
61	20 Oct	Tendalti power station	White Nile	**Ethiopia**	Drones	Power station struck
62	21 Oct	Kober district, Khartoum	Khartoum	**Ethiopian territory**	Suicide · 3 drones	No losses
63	21 Oct	Kologi	S. Kordofan	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	**Fuel station destroyed; 2 civilians killed**
64	22 Oct	Bikori	Blue Nile	**Ethiopian territory**	Strategic (TB2) · 2 munitions	**Shot down**
65	22 Oct	Er Rahad	N. Kordofan	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	**2 fuel stations destroyed; 2 soldiers and 3 civilians killed**
66	23 Oct	Umm Ruwaba	N. Kordofan	**Asosa**	Strategic · 1 munition	Fuel station destroyed; 2 civilians wounded
67	25 Oct	Um Alila fuel depot	N. Kordofan	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	Tanker truck destroyed
68	25 Oct	Umm Ruwaba	N. Kordofan	**Asosa**	Strategic · 2 munitions	2 fuel stations destroyed
69	26 Oct	Power stations: Singa, Al-Fao, Al-Hawata, Mashkour, Al-Junaid	Several	**Asosa**	Strategic · 4 munitions	All five stations put out of service
70	27 Oct	Al-Markhiyat power station, Omdurman	Khartoum	**Ethiopian territory**	Suicide · 2 drones	2 main transformers destroyed

Annex B — Attacks on the National Power Grid

Date	Attack
Tuesday 3 March 2026	Main power station of El Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, struck in the early morning.
Tuesday 10 March 2026	Um Dabakir thermal power station, White Nile State: two transformers set ablaze; power cut across large parts of the State.
Tuesday 20 October 2026	Power station at Tendalti, White Nile State.
Monday 26 October 2026	Five stations struck in one wave: Singa (Sennar state), Al-Fao and Al-Hawata (Gedaref state), Mashkour (White Nile state) and the Al-Junaid transformer station (Gezira state). All five put out of service.
Tuesday 27 October 2026	Al-Markhiyat transformer station, Omdurman: two main transformers destroyed; station completely out of service; power cut to Omdurman, Khartoum and Gezira State.

Annex C — Glossary

Akıncı	Bayraktar Akıncı: Turkish twin-engine, medium-altitude long-endurance armed drone manufactured by Baykar
Autopilot	On-board flight-control computer that stores and executes a pre-programmed mission
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Force
FPV	First-person-view drone, piloted through a live camera feed
GCS	Ground-control station from which a drone is commanded
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
MALE	Medium-altitude long-endurance (strategic) drone
MAVLink	Open communication and mission protocol used by many drone flight controllers
NCAGE	NATO Commercial and Government Entity code identifying a manufacturer
NSN	NATO Stock Number; digits 5–6 identify the codifying country (27 = Türkiye)
OWA	One-way attack (suicide) drone
RSF	Rapid Support Forces, the militia waging war on the Sudanese State
SATCOM	Satellite communications, used to control drones beyond line of sight
TB2	Bayraktar TB2: Turkish medium-altitude armed drone
Waypoint (WP)	A programmed geographic point on a drone's route