Emblem of the Republic of Sudan

Evidentiary report

Launched from Ethiopia

Forensic, geospatial and documentary evidence of Ethiopia's role in the drone war against the Republic of Sudan

Republic of Sudan · Transitional Sovereignty Council · Advisory Board
Khartoum · October 2026

The Republic of Sudan is being attacked from the territory of a neighbouring State. Since February 2026, armed drones have taken off from Ethiopian soil, from Asosa Airport in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region, from the Ethiopian side of the Kurmuk–Gizen border sector, and from Bahir Dar Air Base in the Amhara Region, to strike Sudanese cities and civilians. This is not an allegation. It is a fact, established by the physical, digital and geospatial evidence set out in this report.

The attackers delivered the decisive proof themselves. On 20 September 2026 the Sudanese Armed Forces brought down a long-range attack drone at Ad-Damazin. Its flight-control computer was recovered and its memory extracted. It holds the complete pre-programmed mission and records, in the aircraft's own data, a take-off at 10.7220° N, 34.7662° E, which is 1.7 kilometres inside Ethiopia, near the Ethiopian locality of Gizen and 65 kilometres from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The take-off, the initial climb and the first ten kilometres of the programmed route all lie over Ethiopian territory.

State-grade aircraft fly from an Ethiopian air base. Bayraktar Akıncı strategic drones, an aircraft that Türkiye sells only to sovereign governments and which the Ethiopian Air Force publicly inducted in January 2024, have flown from Bahir Dar Air Base to attack Sudan. One was shot down near El Obeid on 17 March 2026, a second near Ad-Damazin on 23 May and a third over Dindiro on 23 August; two Bayraktar TB2 followed in October. The wreckage carries manufacturer plates whose part and serial numbers identify the aircraft and their end-user.

The launch infrastructure has also been exposed by independent investigators. Reuters revealed in February 2026 that Ethiopia had built a camp at Menge where 4,300 RSF fighters were in training, and that a drone ground-control station and a satellite antenna had been installed at Asosa Airport. In April 2026 the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale reported clear visual evidence that RSF attacks on Blue Nile State were launched from inside Ethiopia.

The price is paid in Sudanese lives. At Wad el-Mahi on 9 October, a drone attack on displaced families killed thirty people, twenty-six women and four children, and wounded one hundred. In Khartoum on 19 October, three children aged two to six were killed in their home. On 26 and 27 October six power stations were put out of service, plunging millions into darkness.

This report sets out the evidence. It is conclusive.

The campaign in figures

70
drone attacks launched from Ethiopian territory, 15 Feb – 27 Oct 2026
1.7 km
inside Ethiopia: take-off point recorded by a recovered flight computer
5
strategic drones shot down: three Bayraktar Akıncı and two Bayraktar TB2
187
suicide drones recorded, and 82 munitions fired by strategic drones
484
civilians killed or wounded (consolidated figures)
176
Sudanese soldiers killed in attacks launched from Ethiopia

The five findings

  1. The launch sites are in Ethiopia. Attacks are launched from Asosa Airport in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region, from the Ethiopian side of the Kurmuk border sector, from the Gizen area opposite Geissan, and from Bahir Dar Air Base in the Amhara Region. See the map
  2. A recovered flight computer proves it. The autopilot of a long-range attack drone brought down at Ad-Damazin on 20 September 2026 records its take-off at 10.7220° N, 34.7662° E, 1.7 km inside Ethiopia. Its programmed 134.04 km route enters Sudanese airspace only about ten kilometres after take-off. Exhibit A
  3. State-grade aircraft fly from an Ethiopian air base. Bayraktar Akıncı strategic drones, a system sold only to sovereign governments and publicly inducted into the Ethiopian Air Force in January 2024, flew from Bahir Dar Air Base. Serial-numbered Baykar and Aselsan components were recovered from aircraft downed near El Obeid and Ad-Damazin. Exhibit B
  4. The campaign targets civilians. Hospitals, schools, homes, displaced-persons sites, fuel stations and power stations have been struck. At Wad el-Mahi on 9 October, thirty people, twenty-six women and four children, were killed and one hundred wounded. In Khartoum on 19 October, three children aged two to six were killed. Six power stations were knocked out on 26–27 October. Exhibit D
  5. Independent investigations corroborate every element. Reuters exposed an Ethiopian-hosted RSF training camp and a drone ground-control station at Asosa Airport; the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale found clear visual evidence that RSF attacks on Blue Nile were launched from inside Ethiopia; satellite monitoring has tracked UAE-linked cargo aircraft at Asosa. Exhibit E

Conclusion

Ethiopia bears international responsibility for these attacks. By launching, hosting or enabling armed drone operations from its sovereign territory against Sudan, Ethiopia is using force against the territorial integrity of Sudan in breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Its conduct falls squarely within the acts of aggression defined in Article 3(f) and 3(g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), and violates Article 4(f) and 4(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Republic of Sudan will lodge a formal complaint against the States involved and reserves in full its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

What Sudan demands

  • The immediate cessation of all drone launches from Ethiopian territory and the closure of the launch facilities at Asosa, the Kurmuk–Gizen border sector and Bahir Dar to RSF and third-party operations.
  • The dismantling of the RSF training camp at Menge and the withdrawal of all support to the militia.
  • Immediate and effective measures by the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council to ensure full compliance by all Member States with international law, particularly the obligations of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  • Accountability and reparation for the deaths, injuries and destruction caused.

The Government of Sudan offers the recovered wreckage, flight-control hardware, original files and chain-of-custody records for independent technical examination under United Nations or African Union auspices.

Sudan's full position and recommendations