A war waged on the Sudanese State from abroad

A militia sustained by foreign supply lines

Since April 2023 the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has waged war on the Sudanese State and its people. The militia's capacity to fight has never rested on domestic resources alone. In January 2024 the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan described as credible the reports of UAE arms deliveries to the RSF through eastern Chad.¹ Further reports from the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission and other sources document the networks sustaining this external support. In September 2026, the Mission found reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational network supplied the RSF with weapons, logistical assistance, training and foreign personnel. It further found that individuals and entities operating from, registered in, or linked to the UAE played a significant role in financing and deploying foreign military contractors and providing military-related support to the RSF.² In January 2025, the United States Treasury had already sanctioned UAE-based Capital Tap Holding and associated companies, stating that Capital Tap had supplied the RSF with money and weapons.³ In May 2025, Amnesty International identified Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and AH-4 howitzers used by the RSF, concluding that these weapons had almost certainly been re-exported to the possession of the RSF by the UAE.⁴

Further investigations identify military preparation and support activities on Ethiopian territory. In February 2026, Reuters reported an RSF training camp at Menge, citing an Ethiopian security note that identified the Ethiopian National Defence Force's defence-intelligence chief as responsible for establishing it. Eight sources attributed financing, trainers and logistical support to the UAE.⁵ In June 2026, Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab documented continuing activity at an Ethiopian military base in Asosa consistent with military support to the RSF. Its satellite and open-source analysis identified the transport and modification of vehicles, including repainting and possible weapons mounting, consistent with equipping RSF forces operating in Blue Nile State.⁶

The consequences for civilians have been devastating. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded that drone strikes caused at least 880 civilian deaths between January and April 2026, more than 80 per cent of all conflict-related civilian deaths in that period, and more than 1,000 by the end of May. In the first three weeks of October 2026 alone, drone strikes killed at least 306 people.⁷ The drone has become the principal instrument of killing in Sudan and, as this report demonstrates, a growing share of these drones is launched from Ethiopia.

The opening of an eastern front

On 25 January 2026 the RSF and the al-Hilu faction of the SPLM-N opened an offensive against Blue Nile State along the Ethiopian border. Kurmuk fell in March and was liberated by the Sudanese Armed Forces on 8 July 2026. Nearly 100,000 people have been displaced in Blue Nile State this year.⁸ The offensive did not come from nowhere: it was prepared, staged and supplied from the Ethiopian side of the border, where a training camp for RSF fighters had been under construction since 2025.

Sudan's restraint and Ethiopia's denials

Sudan has responded with restraint and through diplomatic channels. On 3 March 2026 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that drones had been launched from Ethiopia, describing the launches as a flagrant violation of Sudanese sovereignty.⁹ On 5 May 2026, after drones struck Khartoum International Airport days after it received its first international flight in three years, Sudan presented evidence that the drones had been launched from Bahir Dar and recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa.¹⁰ On 28 October 2026 Sudan presented the wreckage, flight data and incident log reproduced in this report.

Ethiopia's answer has been a bare denial, coupled with counter-accusations. It has not offered verification, has not explained the activity documented at its airfields, and has not addressed a single item of the physical evidence. A denial is not a rebuttal.