Section 10
Questions and answers
The questions most often raised about the evidence, answered.
Could the drones have been launched from inside Sudan by the RSF or its allies?
No. The flight computer of the drone that attacked Ad-Damazin records a take-off point 1.7 km inside Ethiopia and a route that remains over Ethiopian territory for its first ten kilometres. The Akıncı strategic drones require runways, satellite links and ground-control stations that exist only at established airfields; the El Obeid track originated at Bahir Dar. After the liberation of Kurmuk on 8 July, short-range drones with a 30 km reach continued to strike the town and the surrounding army positions from beyond Sudanese lines, from the Ethiopian side of the boundary.
Could the flight data have been fabricated or altered?
The data passes every test of internal consistency. The route length recomputed from the raw coordinates matches the reported figure to the hundredth of a kilometre; the altitude profile and command sequence form a coherent operational mission; the target coordinates correspond to the area where the aircraft was brought down. The hardware is available for independent forensic examination. See Exhibit A.
The Sudanese Army itself operates Turkish drones. Could the downed Akıncı have been Sudanese?
No. A Sudanese aircraft does not take off from an Ethiopian air base, does not route through South Sudanese airspace to evade Sudanese air defences, and does not attack Sudanese cities. The Akıncı downed near Ad-Damazin on 23 May was intercepted by a Sudanese Akıncı. The serial numbers on the recovered components allow the manufacturer and the exporting State to identify the end-user of each aircraft in a matter of hours; Sudan formally invites investigators to ask Türkiye to do so. See Exhibit B.
Ethiopia denies the accusations and says Sudan supports Ethiopian armed opposition. Does that change the analysis?
No. A denial that does not address the evidence carries no weight against wreckage, flight data and satellite imagery. A counter-allegation, which is not substantiated, provides no legal justification for armed attacks against Sudan. Sudan calls for independent verification.
Could these activities have occurred without the knowledge of the Ethiopian Government?
No. The launch sites are an ENDF airfield at Asosa, an Ethiopian Air Force base at Bahir Dar, and a border zone 65 km from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. According to an internal Ethiopian security note reported by Reuters, the RSF camp at Menge was established by the Chief of Defence Intelligence of the ENDF. The scale of the activity, truck convoys, hundreds of tents, cargo flights and drone infrastructure, is incompatible with ignorance.
Why does it matter who launched the drones if the RSF is the party to the conflict?
Because the territory and the facilities are Ethiopia's. Under international law, a State that places its territory at the disposal of another for aggression, or that supports armed bands attacking its neighbour, commits an internationally wrongful act of its own. The drones are not an internal Sudanese matter: they cross an international boundary. See the legal assessment.
Is Sudan seeking war with Ethiopia?
No. Sudan has exercised strategic patience, has addressed Ethiopia through diplomatic channels since March 2026, has turned to the international community and will lodge a formal complaint against the States involved. Sudan does not initiate aggression against any State. But it will not accept that its territory remain a target: should the international mechanisms fail to enforce the law and bring the attacks to an end, Sudan will exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, at the time and in the manner it deems appropriate.
Why must the international community act now?
Because the campaign is escalating: October 2026 alone accounts for 40 per cent of the logged attacks and more than half of all suicide drones launched. The targeting of the power grid now threatens water, health care and food security for millions. Drone operations alongside the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam add a grave risk to regional stability. Every week of silence costs Sudanese lives.